Publications:
Teaching Production with SimCity BuildIt, Journal of Economics Teaching, Volume 11(1), 1-26, 2026.
Bank Bailouts: Moral Hazard and Commitment , Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 111, April 2024, 102939. (Best Paper In Financial Institutions Track at Southwestern Finance Association Conference)
Monetary and Fiscal Coordination in Preventing Bank Failures and Financial Contagion, Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 75, March 2023, 103498.
The Optimal Bailout Policy in an Interbank Network, Economics Letters, Volume 216, July 2022, 110628 .
Working Papers:
Benefit Cliffs in California Public Assistance (with Ali Mohammed Bazarah and Abigail Larsson), Revision Submitted to Public Finance Review
Abstract: This paper examines the existence and effects of benefit cliffs in California’s public assistance programs. Utilizing data from ACS and PUMS over the period of 5 years, and using Chow Regression Testing, this study aims to find evidence that benefit cliffs exist in California public assistance programs. The results from the Chow test provide robust evidence of a significant structural change in the relationship between independent variables and hours worked at key phase-out levels, validating the existence of these cliffs. This analysis reveals the income ranges in which the substantial decline in benefits may offset the increase in wages and earnings. A theoretical model is also introduced to validate the empirical findings, showing how individuals decide on hours worked when facing potential benefit cliffs. With the identification of these benefit cliffs, this paper provides the evidence to support policy reformation aimed at providing stability for individuals at phase-out income thresholds.
Bailout of Large Banks, Under Review
Abstract: The model introduced in this paper investigates the effect of the size of large banks on economic welfare. I show that the existence of such a large bank does not always reduce welfare, contrary to the conventional notion of banks being "too big to fail". Depending on its size and the social cost of bailouts, the presence of a large bank can improve welfare. This result is driven primarily by the increased political scrutiny surrounding large- bank bailouts, which causes the bank to indirectlly and partially internatize the cost of being rescued.
Intrahousehold Dynamics on Job Demand and Turnover Intention: Theory and Evidence (with Michael T. Ford and Youjeong Huh), Under Review
Abstract: The study presented in this paper utilizes a survey of 158 pairs of dual-earner couples in the U.S. to investigate how employee's job demands affect their job turnover intention through intrahousehold interaction between the employee and their spouse. We find that an employee's family-to-work transition moderates a positive relationship between job demands and their work-family-conflict. Additionally, we find evidence of female employee's work-family conflict influences their turnover intention through their male spouse's perception and psychological contract violation towards the employee's organization. However, evidence of such channel among male employees is weak. We subsequently estimate the non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining models of intrahousehold decision-making using the same data, and find similar gender differences in how spouse's psychological contract violation and employee's turnover intention are developed.
Abstract: This paper reinforces a common opinion that bank bailouts create moral hazard by showing that bailouts foster excessive risk-taking behavior in banks. However, restricting bailouts altogether is also suboptimal as it forces banks to be overly conservative and forego the benefit that comes from the higher expected returns from risky investments. Therefore, restricting bailouts does not always dominate allowing bailouts and vice versa. However, allowing bailouts can become constrained efficient if implemented together with appropriate Pigouvian taxes. Additionally, if bailout policies can be precommitted ex ante, allowing bailouts can also be constrained efficient.
Works in Progress:
Prospect Theory and Bank Fragility
Credit Card Interchange Fees and Rewards as Regressive Taxation
Opacity, Bailout, and Bank Fragility (with Ryuichiro Izumi)
Predicting Bank Failures Using Recurrent Neural Networks